The collective responsibility problem

Imagine you’re a policeman at a subway station. Freeriders are trying to jump over the tourniquets, you’re catching them. There’s a lot of them and only one of you. Is it possible to set such «rules of the game» that they won’t dare to jump even if it’s known you’ll be able to catch only one of them?

Turns out it is possible, but not trivial. Such ways to prevent widespread violations can be used (and are in some countries) to fight avoiding taxes, exam cheating, bribery and so on.

This talk will be about math and game theory foundations behind some intricate control algorithms. The talk won’t get you a diploma and won’t let you instantly be able to write more effective algorithms, but it will give you an idea of how rich a mathematical model there is.

If you’re interested in game theory and in research that has led to several Nobel prizes in economics, welcome.